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Although not so designated, Fannie/Freddie are 
each bigger than the largest financial 
institutions which have made the SIFI list. With 
$3.3 trillion in assets, Fannie would in fact be 
the biggest SIFI in the U.S. and in the world, 
and Freddie would be in fourth place in the 
U.S. More importantly, Fannie is leveraged 
341-to-1 and Freddie has leverage of 153-to-1. 
The current debate on U.S. housing 
policy focuses on the role of the 
government in supporting the mort-
gage market. Existing organizations 
(Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac) are in 
conservatorship, and Congress is 
considering alternative structures and 
guarantees including catastrophic 
insurance in support of the coverage 
from private companies. This 
research reviews public policy and 
the experience of governmental 
catastrophic insurance with particular 
reference to FDIC coverage for bank 
accounts. 
A government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) 
is a financial services corporation created 
by the U.S. Congress. Its function is to 
enhance the flow of credit to targeted 
sectors of the economy and to make those 
segments of the capital market more 
efficient and transparent, and to reduce the 
risk to investors and other suppliers of 
capital. The desired effect of the GSEs is to 
enhance the availability and reduce the cost 
of credit to the targeted borrowing sectors, 
primarily by reducing the risk of capital 
losses to investors in agriculture, home 
mortgages and education.
Variation in Liquidity Ratios by Industry Aggregates during the 2008-2012 Recession It is inherently more accurate and useful to measure liquidity using at least one account derived from the income statement, which covers the act vities of an entire fiscal period rather than the status as of a single dat .  Although TR/CF is not a ratio that is generally not considered as a standard financial measure, it appears to better reflect industry experience with actual
The purpose of Fannie Mae (Federal 
National Mortgage Association) and 
Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation) has been to support 
the secondary mortgage market by 
securitizing mortgages in the form of 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS). This 
allows lenders to reinvest their assets into 
more lending and in effect increase the 
number of lenders in the mortgage market. 
The Federal Housing Finance Agency, 
supported by the U.S. Treasury, placed 
Fannie/Freddie into conservatorship in 
September 2008. It was one of the 
significant financial events among many in 
the ongoing subprime mortgage crisis. 
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010 
creating the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council with the power to designate System-
ically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). 
The law defines these financial institutions 
whose failure might trigger a financial crisis 
that would endanger the financial system. All 
U.S. bank holding companies with assets 
exceeding $50 billion are automatically SIFIs; 
the FSOC can designate others, even if they 
are not banks. Dodd-Frank identifies many 
considerations, including: financial leverage, 
both on and off the formal balance sheet; inter-
connectedness with other SIFIs; the impor-
tance of a company as a source of credit for 
households, businesses and local governments; 
and maturity (duration) mismatches between 
short-term funding and long-term lending. 
(Financial leverage is using debt to increase 
the assets of an organization’s balance sheet.)
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac helped put the 
U.S. into its biggest bad debt and banking crisis 
since 1933, with their guarantees of securities 
backed by mortgage loans. The GSE’s could not 
pursue prudent lending once the government 
decided to pursue an explicit policy of home 
ownership for “sub-prime” borrowers, who 
would not be qualified for conventional loans 
based on traditional banking standards. Sub-
prime loans tripled (as a percentage of all 
housing credit) between 2001 and 2006, with 
down payments permitted as low as 3% of loan-
to-(appraised house) value. The financial 
collapse that began in 2008 led to massive loan 
defaults by these borrowers, many situations 
where the mortgage amount exceeded the value 
of the home, and the cessation of required 
monthly mortgage payments of principal and 
interest. The two firms received a $187 billion 
federal bailout and have been required to 
transfer all of their profits to the U.S. Treasury. 
Although they currently are profitable, pay-
ing dividends to the Treasury, Fannie/ 
Freddie would not exist today without 
government assistance, and are leading 
examples of “too big to fail”. Support 
continues due to a lack of consensus on 
how to replace them without a complete 
and painful overhaul of the U.S. housing-
finance system. Who was to blame? In 
retrospect there were many “smoking guns” 
responsible for this situation (Note: MBS = 
mortgage-backed securities)
• Lenders (for sub-prime mortgages)
• Investment bankers (for writing MBSs) 
• Rating agencies (for incorrect assigned 
investment grade ratings)
• Institutional investors (for purchasing 
MBSs without any real analysis)
• Regulators (for insufficient oversight)
• Congress (for insisting on home 
ownership for lower income groups)
Is there a solution? In 2015-2016, the 
Senate may reconsider the Housing Finance 
Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 
2014 (also known as the Johnson-Crapo 
Bill for its Senate sponsors), which 
effectively ends Fannie/Freddie, provides 
catastrophic insurance relief for private 
lenders and mortgage insurers who would 
be required to retain a percentage of (and 
not securitize) those loans and would suffer 
losses to the point where a federal loan 
guarantee would provide relief. This 
concept would force lenders to retain some 
ownership of mortgage loans, thereby 
assuring more prudent lending. What are 
the criticisms of Johnson-Crapo? The bill 
features a controversial, possible 
politicization of mortgage credit for 
affordable housing. Some Democrats on the 
Senate Banking Committee said the bill 
would make the cost of a mortgage go up 
too much for middle-income borrowers, 
does not do enough to fund affordable 
housing in low-income neighborhoods, and 
amounts to too significant of an overhaul of 
the system when changes to the current 
model may be the best approach. 
The Research. The role of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) in a 
catastrophic event (a bank failure) will be 
compared to a proposed program of catas-
trophic mortgage insurance. In a bank failure, 
the FDIC seizes the bank’s assets, reorgan-
izes or closes the bank, and pays off deposit-
ors. Mortgage insurance could function in an 
equivalent manner, varying premiums based 
on the riskiness of the mortgages covered by 
private insurers based on FICO scores and 
loan-to-value proportions. Successes/failures 
from FDIC experience, particularly since the 
2008 Great Recession, will be reviewed.
